

The traditional heartland of the Ukrainian Canadians is in the western Prairie Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. This map displays the Ukrainian demographics of those Prairie Provinces in 1971, the very year of the proclamation of multiculturalism as policy by the Government of Canada.

Courtesy of the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. I (1983).

UKRAINIAN CANADIANS ALONG THE BUMPY ROAD

TO OFFICIAL MULTICULTURALISM

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In 2015, Justin Trudeau was elected Prime Minister of Canada on a platform of change and openness. During the election, the country's previous government leader, the Conservative Steven Harper, had made an express appeal to division among the citizenry. He did this through his call to "old stock Canadians" to rally to the Conservative cause. This may have been a kind of verbal slip, but it was also a clear form of ethnic chauvinism, which excluded newer Canadians, newer ethnic and religious groups, and recent immigrants, who had already acquired citizenship. And it came as a shock to the country, which had evolved over the course of the previous century from a self-governing colony of the British Empire, with a largely British and French origin population, to a significantly poly-ethnic society with a proclaimed national ethos of multiculturalism. This multiculturalism expressly supported the erasure of all forms of national, ethnic, or religious discrimination. Most probably, Harper's remark was directed

primarily to English and French Canadians. But his government had also been friendly to some smaller groups identifying with this “old stock Canadians” slogan, such as certain more extreme rightist elements of the well-established Ukrainian community, and perhaps some others as well. In the end, his open call to division and ethnic chauvinism was resoundingly rejected by the voting citizenry at large, and he was defeated at the polls.

Perhaps it was partly because of this national experience that his successor, Justin Trudeau, made a special point of stressing the multicultural character of his new government, where representatives of ethnic and visible minorities such as Ukrainian Canadian Chrystia Freeland, Afghan Canadian Miriam Monsef, and others, Sikh and Somali, held important posts. (Exactly half of his first government was female.) The country accepted Justin Trudeau’s position on diversity in an understanding way, as he was the eldest son of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who in October 1971, had first declared “multiculturalism” to be official government policy. In fact, together with official bilingualism, and a new Canadian constitution to promote it, multiculturalism was apparently one of Pierre Trudeau’s greatest achievements regarding the national identity. To this day, it unites with government-supported Medicare and a peaceful foreign policy agenda, to help define this identity.¹

The image of Pierre Elliott Trudeau as a forceful promoter and successful initiator of multiculturalism is, however, exaggerated, if not completely erroneous. Pierre Trudeau was never an enthusiast for multiculturalism and clearly had other goals in mind, when he announced it as federal policy. He had come to power with the help of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, who wished to diffuse an impatient Quebec nationalism that had seen symbols of the old British Empire defaced in Quebec, and federal post office boxes bombed and destroyed. Something obviously had to be done, and a group of three popular anti-nationalist Quebecers, the so-called “three wise men,” Jean Marchand, Gérard Pelletier, and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, moved into the federal government, where Trudeau inherited the reins of power and immediately instituted a wide-ranging series of reforms aimed at turning bilingual, first the federal civil service, and then as much of the country as possible.

Trudeau also promoted a progressive social policy, a more “Just Society” (to use his own slogan), and more independence of, not only Great Britain (to which the country was still tied constitutionally), but also away from the USA (to which it was increasingly tied economically), and so he wished to change foreign policy. Trudeau was an intellectual with some social democratic convictions, who wished to distance Canada from Cold War tensions; consequently, he also wanted to make the country more open to the world beyond Britain and the USA, more cosmopolitan, and friendlier to the other half of the world that was ruled by Communist regimes.

¹ For a general introduction to the concept of multiculturalism, as applied both in Canada and in other countries, see Harold Troper, “Multiculturalism,” in the *Encyclopedia of Canada’s Peoples*, ed. Paul Robert Magocsi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 997-1006; for some international comparisons, see Jatinder Mann, *The Search for a New Identity: The Rise of Multiculturalism in Canada and Australia, 1890s-1970s* (New York: Peter Lang, 2016); and for introductory explorations of the Ukrainian Canadian contribution to the concept, see Julia Lalande, “The Roots of Multiculturalism: Ukrainian Canadian Involvement in the Multiculturalism Discussion of the 1960s as an Example of the Position of the ‘Third Force’,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 38, 1 (2006), 47-64, and my “How the Ukrainians Helped Make Canada What it is Today,” *Ukrainian Weekly* (New Jersey), 27 August, 2017, 9 and 12, which is also available on-line at the Slideshare website. For a detailed personal memoir, which, however, concentrates on the post-1971 period, see Manoly R. Lupul, *The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian Canadian Memoir* (Edmonton-Toronto: CIUS, 2005).

At that point, very few people indeed had ever heard of the word or concept of “multi-culturalism,” which was still a neologism in the English language.²

FIRST HESITANT STEPS

But some concerned public figures were vaguely aware of this new word, and the concept had many clear precedents. Firstly, in the early part of the twentieth century, Canadian nationalists of an older type often contrasted Canadian identity and policy, which stressed British heritage and British tradition, with the “melting-pot” ideology of the USA to the south. Others, beginning with Sir Wilfred Laurier at the turn of the twentieth century, and Lord Tweedsmuir and J.M. Gibbon in the 1930s, praised Canadian diversity, and they clearly moved past British imperial sentiment toward a newer and more native “mosaic” concept of Canadian identity. Tweedsmuir, the Governor-general of the time, who was a proud Scott, told the Prairie Ukrainians, who were by then a significant demographic group with a growing national profile, that by being good Ukrainians they would also be good Canadians.³

During the Second World War, the federal government promoted a “Canadians All” cultural and ideological program that complemented its model, which was the “Americans All” program that had seized much of the great republic to the south. In Canada, the older motto of “the Empire is our country and Canada is our home” remained strong, especially among the military. But non-British Canadians were by now given more attention than ever before. Concerned about the loyalties of the numerous non-British and non-French citizenry, especially “large blocks of unassimilated Slavs on the Prairies,” the Ottawa government set up a new Nationalities Branch in the Department of National War Services to monitor the ethnic (or “foreign language” as it was then deemed) press and help get all Canadians on-side for the war effort. The multilingual Ukrainian, Vladimir Kaye (originally Kysilevsky or Kysilewskyj) was the central figure of this small department to 1947, when it was renamed the Citizen Branch.

In that same year, Kaye’s younger colleague in the Department, Alberta-born Ukrainian, Stephen Davidovich, helped write the new Citizenship Act, which for the first time in history allowed Canadians to travel abroad on their own Canadian passports, rather than on Imperial British Passports. Like the 1930s Statute of Westminster, which allowed the self-governing dominions of the British Empire more independence in foreign affairs, and Canada’s separate Declaration of War against Nazi Germany some ten days after Britain’s declaration, this new Canadian Citizenship Act was an important further step along the road to full independence for the country. Consequently, as the British connection was loosened, a need for further definition of a new non-British Canadian national identity steadily arose. This was so, not only in English-speaking Canada, but also within the predominantly French-speaking Province of Quebec.⁴

² According to the *On-line Etymological Dictionary*, it was first used in English in 1965. For a refinement of this dating, see the discussion below. As to a “Just Society,” this emanated not only from Trudeau’s earlier position as Pearson’s Minister of Justice, but also seemed at the time to be an echo, or rejoinder to, American President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society” announced only shortly before; hence, the naming of Pierre’s son “Justin.”

³ On Gibbon and Tweedsmuir, see Frances Swyripa, *Ukrainian Canadians: A Survey of their Portrayal in English-language Works* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1978), 26-64, and Ken McGoogan, *How the Scots invented Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2010), 276-82. For the relevant text of Tweedsmuir’s speech, see Bohdan S. Kordan and Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainians in Canada 1899-1962* (Kingston: Limestone Press, 1986), 63-64.

⁴ See my *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: MHSO, 1988). On Kaye, see my “Vladimir Kaye-Kysilewskyj in Europe, Canada, and Britain.” 11 pp. Illust. On-line at:

In the aftermath of the War, which had devastated much of Europe and financially destroyed Germany, France, and the British Empire, but left the USA and Canada intact and stronger than ever before, newer horizons arose. One colony after another of the Dutch, British, and French empires gained their independence, beginning with the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), and continuing with India and others, more slowly with several important French colonies. By 1960, when Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker reacted to the vociferous accusations of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev about Western “imperialism and colonialism” and addressed the United Nations in New York City, some fourteen former British colonies had achieved state independence, of which this still strongly pro-British Canadian PM, despite his German name, was quite proud.

JOHN G. DIEFENBAKER

It was about this same time that the Ukrainian Canadians began to exercise some modest influence on federal government policy. “Dief” as he was popularly known, who was quite close to his numerous Ukrainian and other non-British constituents in his Saskatchewan riding of Prince Albert, became a personal friend of the Rev. Wasyl Kushnir, the first President of the umbrella Ukrainian Canadian Committee (later Congress); at the advice of Kushnir and others, in his UN speech, he actually brought up the oppression of what he expressly labelled “the freedom-loving Ukrainians” in the USSR and accused that multi-national but authoritarian and highly centralized state of being, in fact, the greatest imperialist power in the world. This UN debate on “colonialism and imperialism” ended with Khrushchev shouting, gesticulating, banging his desk with his fists, and waving his shoe about threateningly. It was the most tumultuous and ungentlemanly debate ever conducted in the history of that august assembly, and the Ukrainian question mentioned by Diefenbaker, which so upset Khrushchev and his comrades, stood at its centre.⁵



The Rev. Wasyl Kushnir (1893-1979) was the long-time priest of the great Ukrainian Catholic Church of Saint Vladimir and Olga in Winnipeg and President of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (later Congress). He was noted for his political acumen and epicurean tastes, and was not exactly an unworldly parish priest. For this, he was lampooned by the satirical journal *Komar* (The Mosquito) in one of its first Canadian issues (January, 1950). The verse beneath the caricature, which I translate with some poetic licence, reads: “An ascetic he is, and a democrat/A splendid orator/KUK’s president/But also a dictator/ No less than autocrat.”



https://www.slideshare.net/ThomasMPrymak/vladimir-kayekysilewskyj-in-europe-canada-and-britain?qid=0d5cbc15-b14a-44bd-a1c7-d45289540172&v=&b=&from_search=1 Or at:

https://www.academia.edu/39836385/Vladimir_Kaye_Kysilewskyj_in_Europe_Canada_and_Britain Accessed 8/30/2021. Also see the chapter titled: “In the shadow of a Political Assassination: Gabrielle Roy’s ‘Stephen’ and the Ukrainian Canadians,” in my *Gathering a Heritage: Ukrainian, Slavonic, and Ethnic Canada and the USA* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 169-92. I interviewed Stephen Davidovich in Toronto, December, 1983.

⁵ On Diefenbaker and the Ukrainians, I have written: “Cold War Clash, New York City, September, 1960: Comrade Khrushchev vs Dief the Chief,” 18 pages MS. Approx. 32 pages in print. Unpublished.

Diefenbaker's close association with Ukrainian causes also included the proclamation of a Bill of Rights that went hand in hand with his actions at the United Nations. This Bill was passed by Parliament into statute law in August 1960, just before his United Nations speech, and expressly outlawed any discrimination based on national, ethnic, or religious origin. "Dief," as he was popularly called, considered it to be one of his greatest legislative achievements. However, it had some severe limitations, as it was merely a federal statute and was not embedded in any constitutional document. This was clearly recognised at the time by the opposition Liberals (and by Diefenbaker himself) and remembered across the next decade or two of Canadian history.⁶



Front page of Winnipeg's nationalist/Conservative *Novyi shliakh* (The New Pathway) 8 August 1960, announcing that Diefenbaker's Bill of Rights had been passed by Parliament into law. The article on the right with the picture of the PM in the middle is titled: "Parliament unanimously approves of a Declaration of Human and Civil Rights." In its editorial, the paper praised the new law, but noted its limitations.

Furthermore, Diefenbaker, who was loyal to his Prairie roots, bucked American political pressure, initiated the first sales of Western Canadian wheat to Red China, and seems to have made the first moves towards doing the same for the USSR. (Certainly, by 1961 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was quietly approached about this matter.) This turned many Prairie Ukrainian farmers, traditionally Liberal, towards the Conservatives, who previously had largely ignored them. The turn to the Tories by the members and descendants of the older pioneer immigration of Ukrainians to Canada, together with the strongly anti-Communist sentiments of the newer post-1945 immigration, made for a solid pro-Conservative voting block that became a fixture in Canadian politics and lasted throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.⁷

But Diefenbaker's UN call for freedom for the non-Russian peoples of the USSR was immediately followed by a parallel problem at home in Canada. Before his last term in office had ended, Quebec nationalists had begun defacing British symbols and placing bombs in postal boxes in Quebec cities. Whether these events had any connection to Diefenbaker's (or Khrushchev's) UN speech on colonialism/imperialism, and how the Soviet press and government reacted to the Quebec events, has not yet seen any serious research. But the timing may be somewhat more than simply a coincidence.

Certainly, years later, when Pierre Elliott Trudeau made his first openings to the Soviets, he was careful to avoid provoking them on their national question, especially on Ukraine itself, as he wished to avoid untoward comparisons between the Soviet and the Canadian situations. At

⁶ It was warmly welcomed by minorities like the Ukrainians. See, for example, Toronto's Conservative-leaning *Vilne slovo* (The Free Word), 20 August, 1960: "Zakon pro prava liudyny" [A Law about Personal Rights], and Winnipeg's *Novyi shliakh* (The New Pathway), 6 August, 1960, citing Liberal support for the Bill.

⁷ It was in 1961 that Diefenbaker's fellow prairie lawyer, the prominent Ukrainian Canadian Wasyl Swystun, went to Moscow and discussed wheat sales personally with Khrushchev. See "Re: Wasyl Swystun," Mykhailo Marunchak Archives, Box 7/23, Oseredok, Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre, Winnipeg. A very brief note on this visit appeared in the pro-Communist Winnipeg newspaper *Ukrainske slovo* (The Ukrainian Word) 6 September, 1961.

any rate, once the Pandora's Box of extreme Quebec nationalism had been opened, it could not be easily closed. Diefenbaker's major move to expand French language use and rights was to introduce simultaneous French-English translation into the federal parliament. But the federal civil service remained solidly Anglophone outside Quebec, and the Department of External Affairs was especially so. Spurred by this situation, and with the general decline of the British Empire in the background, and the need for a new non-imperial Canadian identity to replace it, a Quebec nationalism, separate from a previous French-Canadian identity, continued to grow alongside a more general Canadian identity, and Ottawa saw this as a threat to national unity.

THE "B AND B" COMMISSION

When the Liberal Lester B. Pearson replaced the Progressive Conservative Diefenbaker as Prime Minister, he was determined to address this national question head on. In 1963, one of his first moves was to establish an epoch-making Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to recommend solutions to this newly pressing problem. The very name of the Commission suggested the solutions that he had in mind: official bilingualism and official biculturalism. But various "national" minorities, who felt left out of this equation, led by the increasingly confident Ukrainians, immediately sounded the alarm. Leading the charge, Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos* (The Ukrainian voice) demanded that attention be paid not only to people of British and French background, but also to Canadians of "other" origin, those who were neither French nor English.⁸

According to the census of 1961, Ukrainians then made up just under three per cent of all Canadians. They then stood fourth in numbers after the British, the French, and the Germans, and still outnumbered all the other Slavonic groups combined. By right, the Germans should have led the charge in what would soon be called a "Third Force" in Canadian politics. Many German Canadians were, of course, interested in the national question and worried about their future in the country, just like the Ukrainians. But being related to "the enemy" in two world wars intimidated most German Canadians, and they were to keep a low profile throughout the debate that followed. So, it fell quite naturally to the next largest group that was greatly threatened by assimilation, the Ukrainians themselves, to fill this role, which they were to do deliberately and enthusiastically.⁹

As a result, when the government set forth the mandate of the Royal Commission, it took these "other" Canadians into account. The mandate reads thus:

[The Commission is instructed] ...to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to

⁸ "Mova shcho ne spryiaie iednosti," [A Speech that does not Promote Unity] *Ukrainskyi holos*, 30 January, 1963, and "Shcho hovoryt B.N.A. Akt.," [What the British North America Act says] 30 March, 1963.

⁹ For contemporary analysis of the statistics, see I[van] Teslia, "Problema zberezhennia ridnoi movy i kultury ukrainsiv u Kanadi," [The Problem of the Preservation of the Native Language and Culture of the Ukrainians in Canada] *Novyi shliakh*, 17 August, 1963. Also see Ivan Teslia and Paul Yuzyk, *Ukrainci v Kanadi: ikh rozvytok i dosiahnennia* [Ukrainians in Canada: Their Development and Achievements] (Munich: n.p., 1968). For the historical context, see my "Slavonic and Ukrainian Canada in the 2001 Census: A Historian's View," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, 63, 3-4 (2007), 239-45. My views on the German Canadians were largely formed through personal contacts and many interesting conversations with Professor George K. Epp of the Universities of Manitoba and Winnipeg and Helmut Schmidt, also of Winnipeg, in the 1960s and the 1970s. They were to be confirmed by Book IV of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (section on German Canadians, 82-83). See below.

the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution.

This document clearly reflected the government's basic assumptions, thinking, and priorities: English and French were founding "races," as it was put, while other groups were simply "ethnics." As the authors saw it, the English and the French came first and "an equal partnership" was proposed for them. This was a step beyond the British imperial identity of the past and was a democratizing response supporting the more moderate French Canadian nationalists, and in particular, to the suggestions of Quebec journalist André Laurendeau, who had first called for such a commission. It was he as well, who had first used the words "bilingualism" and "biculturalism," at least in this context.¹⁰

Neither of those two "bi" words, it should be noted here, had appeared anywhere in the British North America Act, which was the founding legislative measure of the Westminster Parliament for the Dominion of Canada, and was then still serving as the ad hoc constitution of the Dominion. This was clearly pointed out at that time by Canada's ethnic press, once again by Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos*, which was deeply suspicious of official "bilingualism" and strongly objected to the term "biculturalism." This influential paper for many years had been friendly to the Liberal Party of Canada, and Pearson's addition of the second part dealing with "other" Canadians and their contributions to the country was an obvious response to such offended Canadian opinion, especially on the Prairies, where most of those "other ethnic groups," especially the Slavonic groups, lived. In objecting to "Biculturalism" the paper again claimed to speak for the approximately 27 % of the country that was by that time neither of English nor of French "extraction," as it was usually put.¹¹

Indeed, the very language of the "B and B" mandate reveals other assumptions, which clearly stand out today. Firstly, of course, there was the peculiar use of the term "race." At that time, "race" was often used more generally than it is today. So, in those days one could still speak of a "British Empire," but an "Anglo-Saxon race," and a "French race." This did not exactly correspond to the language of the French original of the document, which spoke of "peoples." Indeed, both Ukrainian Canadians and Jewish Canadians would soon raise objections to this language, which Pearson at first tried to defend in Parliament (at first even slightly underestimating the non-British and non-French at one quarter of the population), but once the Commission had been mandated, there was no going back, and it was stuck with this obsolete language.¹²

¹⁰ See Laurendeau's essay: "A Proposal for an Inquiry into Bilingualism," in *André Laurendeau: Witness for Quebec* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973), 188-89. This essay had been first published in French in *Le Devoir* some years before. More generally, see the *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book I* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, Oct. 8, 1967), Appendix 1, 173. Also see the discussions in Eve Haque, "Canadian Federal Policies on Bilingualism, Multiculturalism, and Immigrant Language Training," in *Canadian Language Policies in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Michael A. Morris (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 267-96, and in Lee Blanding, "Re-Branding Canada: The Origins of Canadian Multiculturalism Policy, 1945-1974," Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Victoria, 2013. 87-99.

¹¹ "Shcho hovoryt B.N.A. Akt."

¹² See "Promova premiera L.B. Pirsona v federalnomu parlamenti," [Prime Minister L.B. Pearson's Speech in the Federal Parliament] *Ukrainskyi holos* 27 November, 1963, 4. Pearson explained that though there was no "Canadian race," there existed both an "Anglo-Saxon" and "French race." Peter Stursberg, *Lester Pearson and the Dream of Unity* (Toronto and New York: Doubleday, 1978), 140-42, provides evidence to the effect that one of Pearson's senior ministers, Jack Pickersgill was the one who, against the expressed wishes of Pearson, insisted upon the word "races" instead of "peoples," thus ignoring the change in meaning from "nationality" to genetic "race" that the word had experienced by the 1960s.

Secondly, the new term “ethnic group” stood at the centre of the second half of the mandate. But it too was problematic. Just as there was probably a subconscious, implied hierarchy between “race” and “ethnic group” in the document, so also there was one between “people” and “ethnic group” in the English language generally. Unlike the first term, “people,” the term “ethnic” in 1963 probably still had some double meaning, as it did in the original Greek and Latin from which it was derived. The Latin *ethnīcus*, meaning both “a people” and “a foreign group,” was derived from the Greek *ethnos*, with the same two meanings (and in this way, for example, it was used in the ancient *Septuagint* or Greek translation of the Bible), which in turn was a translation of the Hebrew *goy*, used to denote non-Israelite people. To the end of the nineteenth century, this “foreign,” even “heathen,” meaning was predominant in the English language, but thereafter the “people” meaning increasingly gained sway. The term only began to replace the earlier terms “nation” and “nationality” in the 1940s, when it was first used so by certain American sociologists. From there, it spread into more general use to partly replace the old word “race,” and (very importantly for Canada) the equally ambiguous term “nationality.”¹³ So from the very start, the “B and B Commission,” as it came to be called, was stuck with certain inequalities that called for correction.

Pearson tried to make such corrections as soon as he learned of their necessity. So, he responded positively to the unexpected minority demand for participation in the Commission and personally called the prominent linguist, Ukrainian Jaroslav Bohdan Rudnyckyj, at his office in the Department of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba, and he invited him to sit on the Commission. Rudnyckyj immediately accepted, and was joined by Paul Wyczynski, a French Canadian literature specialist from the University of Ottawa, who was Polish born.¹⁴

RUDNYCKYJ AND YUZYK

Rudnyckyj was thought to represent “ethnics” in English-speaking Canada, and Wyczynski those in French-speaking Canada. These two scholars, both at least tri-lingual, were chosen to represent all the country’s non-British and non-French origin citizens. But otherwise, Prairie Canada, where most of the Ukrainian Canadians still lived, was under-represented, as were British Columbia and the Maritime Provinces. Nevertheless, both men were to have a profound effect upon the B and B deliberations, Rudnyckyj’s being the most important. He was self-confident, multilingual, cosmopolitan, well-traveled, and well-educated, and he had no hesitation in urging the Ukrainian communities in Canada to get involved in the work of the Commission, most especially in the form of briefs and recommendations to be presented to the commissioners, when they visited various towns and cities across the country.¹⁵

It was at this early stage of the Commission’s existence that the term “multiculturalism” seems to have arisen, perhaps quite naturally. In a “Working Paper” that outlined the government’s current concern with promoting bilingualism and biculturalism, it also mentioned

¹³ Werner Sollars, *Theories of Ethnicity A Classical Reader* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 2-12.

¹⁴ Olha Woycenko, “J.B. Rudnyckyj’s *Vita Intensiva*: A Biographical Sketch,” in *Scripta manent...A Bibliography of J.B. Rudnyckyj* (Winnipeg: Published by Students and Friends on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, 1975), 21.

¹⁵ On Rudnyckyj, see my “Inveterate Voyager: J.B. Rudnyckyj on Ukrainian Culture, Books, and Libraries in the West during the ‘Long Cold War’,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 51, 1 (2009), 53-76, and also my “J. B. Rudnyckyj and Canada.” https://www.slideshare.net/ThomasMPrymak/j-b-rudnyckyj-and-canada?gid=3d0b3213-3158-473a-855b-c2c82b34e242&v=&b=&from_search=1 Accessed 8/30/2021. The second of these titles describes Rudnyckyj’s views on the Ukrainian language widely spoken in Canada in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.


that “other” languages too existed in the Dominion, and they too must be respected. “Multiculturalism” therefore was a simple fact of Canadian reality that, as the “Working Paper” put it, “must not be suppressed as quickly as possible.”

This was the first time that this word had ever been mentioned in any government document. It was seized upon and emphasized by the Ukrainian Canadian Paul Yuzyk in his maiden speech to the Senate of Canada, and Yuzyk, who had just been appointed to the Senate by the outgoing Diefenbaker, later mentioned to one of the other Senators that he himself had coined this term prior to its use in the “Working Paper.” There is no doubt that he was the first to use it in the Parliament of Canada. In that same speech, he linked the term to the Third Element in Canada’s history and to the previous Conservative government’s explicit Bill of Rights, which was aimed at eliminating national, racial, and religious discrimination in the country. Yuzyk concluded by claiming recognition for Canada as “a multicultural nation.”¹⁶

At this point, it is necessary to look a bit more deeply into the characters of these two men, Rudnycky the linguist and Yuzyk the historian, who were to have such an important influence upon the events that followed. Rudnycky’s character, with his cosmopolitanism, his multilingualism, his wide travels, and many interests outside of pure politics, stood in complete contrast with Yuzyk, who ploddingly but stubbornly hammered away at the same theme again and again. That theme was the concept of “multiculturalism,” which he linked to the disappearance of ethnic and national discrimination, of which he claimed to have had personal experience early in his life. Perhaps Isaiah Berlin’s famous quip, about Leo Tolstoy’s view of history being represented by the Hedgehog and the Fox, was equally applicable to the case of the Ukrainian Canadians, Yuzyk and Rudnycky. Berlin cited this ancient Greek proverb to the



effect that “the Fox knows many things,” whereas “the Hedgehog knows only one thing, but it knows it very well indeed.” Not hedgehogs, but rather porcupines are more associated with Canada, and so, in Rudnycky can be clearly seen Berlin’s Fox who knows many things, and in Yuzyk, the Porcupine who knows only one thing, but knows it very well indeed. The B and B Commission’s Report, and the government’s response to it, would determine which would be the more successful strategy in mid-twentieth century Canada.¹⁷



Left: Portrait of Jaroslav Rudnycky in 1963, when he was appointed to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Right: Portrait of Paul Yuzyk of about the same time. Rudnycky was appointed by the Liberal PM, Lester B. Pearson, and Senator Yuzyk by the Progressive Conservative John G. Diefenbaker. Rudnycky was representative of the post-1945 immigration and Yuzyk of the older “pioneer” immigration. Photos courtesy of the University of Manitoba Archives, and Library and Archives Canada (LAC).

¹⁶ See Paul Yuzyk, “Canada: A Multicultural Nation,” in his *For a Better Canada* (Toronto: Ukrainian National Association, 1973), 21–48. Speech of March 3, 1964.

¹⁷ Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History* (New York: Mentor, 1957).

THE COMMISSION'S WORK

The task of the B and B Commission consisted of two parts: firstly, academic work researching solutions to the national question in Canada and even considering foreign models, which might be of use if applied in this country. Britain, Switzerland, and even the Soviet Union, all of which were poly-ethnic, and in the case of the USSR, multi-national and supposedly a federal state, were all brought up. Rudnyckyj was very active on this score.

Secondly, the Commission spent a great deal of time and energy hearing briefs submitted by ethnic groups, universities, and various other academic, political, and business groups. Among the ethnic groups, the Commissioners soon noticed that the Ukrainians were by far the most active element, for they presented more briefs than any other group. Moreover, their briefs were generally well-organized, clear, and insistent: the language and cultural rights of Ukrainian Canadians must be preserved and expanded. The ideas of French-English bilingualism and biculturalism, which had never been mentioned in the British North America Act, must be dropped. Slowly, it also became clear to the Commission that there was enormous opposition in English-speaking Canada to the concept of Two Nations proposed by some French Canadian nationalists, and that the concept of a Third Force in Canadian life was hollow: non-English and non-French Canadians were far too varied and too disunited to agree upon a single political or cultural platform.

By contrast, the new term "Multiculturalism," written this way with a capital "M" and no hyphen, came more and more to the fore. Senator Yuzyk campaigned relentlessly for it and helped draft the brief to the Royal Commission of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC, or KUK in Ukrainian acronym), which was the umbrella organization of all the non-Communist Ukrainian organizations in the country.¹⁸ The UCC had its headquarters in Winnipeg, then the unofficial Ukrainian capital of Canada. In fact, Ukrainian Canadian opposition to compulsory French-English bilingualism was so strong that (in view of Rudnyckyj on the Commission panel and translators readily available) when they presented that brief, they tried to do so in the Ukrainian language, and not in either English or French. Despite their vociferous protests, this action was firmly rejected by the surprised and shaken commissioners, who threatened to leave Winnipeg without hearing the brief, if it were not presented in either French or English. The Ukrainians were eventually forced to give in, and the brief was presented in one of the official languages of the Commission. This fact seemed to reflect the emerging view of most of the Commissioners – minus Rudnyckyj – that while biculturalism was a negotiable issue, English-French bilingualism was not. This episode, one well-informed witness later recalled, left a bad taste in mouths of the disconcerted commissioners.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the country was experiencing one of the most exciting and turbulent periods of its history. These were the years of the national flag debate and the adoption of the new red and white maple leaf flag, the centennial celebrations of the 1867 founding of the Canadian Confederation, the World's Fair-Expo 67 in Montreal, and the Pan-American Games in Winnipeg. This was also the time of French president Charles De Gaulle's *Vive le Quebec libre* speech from the balcony of the Montreal City Hall inciting Quebec nationalism to new and

¹⁸ Information from Oleh Gerus, Winnipeg.

¹⁹ Jean Burnett interview, Toronto, 1988. Further references to the Royal Commission's work are available in my essay on "The Royal Commission and Rudnyckyj's Mission: The Forging of Official Multiculturalism in Canada, 1963-1971," *The University of Toronto Quarterly*, 38, 1 (2019), 43-63, or the much more detailed original of this paper. 26 pp. MS. Approx. 54 pp. in print. Unpublished.

previously unheard-of levels. All this was followed by intensified *Front de libération du Québec* (FLQ) violence in Quebec, the October 1970 Crisis, the kidnapping of British envoy James Cross and the political murder of Quebec minister Pierre Laporte. Equally traumatic was Trudeau's invocation of the War Measures Act, with arrests and armed military on the streets of Quebec City and Montreal, and the arrest and exile of members of the terrorist group.

THE LANGUAGE QUESTION


In view of all this, earlier on, Pearson's government, and later, Pierre Elliott Trudeau's government, rushed to implement the recommendations of the B and B Commission expanding French language rights, especially the use of French in the federal civil service. The federal government also suddenly began to increase the encouragement of the teaching of French in schools and universities across the country, and to press these policies upon the universities and upon various Provincial governments, which had control over education and social welfare.

As to third languages, the Commission recommended that they too should be promoted in certain ways: access to radio and television, as subjects in schools and universities, and as qualifying languages to enter those universities. Various Ukrainian briefs and newspaper articles had demanded it, and all members of the Commission had agreed on it. But Rudnyckyj went even further, and in a dissenting opinion even suggested that, if bilingual French and English districts be set up across the country where numbers allowed it, so too bilingual minority language districts should be established, where services would also be rendered in those languages and the local cultures thus respected. Rudnyckyj especially mentioned Ukrainian on the Prairies, Italian in Toronto and Montreal, and German in certain other places. Significantly (for future development), he also stressed the use of "Indian and Eskimo" in the North. (This recommendation seemingly reflected Rudnyckyj's awareness of the "National-Territorial" approach to the national question that was predominant in Eastern Europe and the USSR.) The Commission did not accept this recommendation, but neither did it reject it. Consequently, Rudnyckyj's *Votum separatum*, as he called it, was published in the Commission's all-important Book I.

NEW FACES: TRUDEAU AND SCHREYER




Left: Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1919-2000) was in his late forties when first elected Prime Minister of Canada. Right: Ed Schreyer (b. 1935) was even younger when elected Premier of Manitoba. Both men stood to the left of centre politically and brought a new spirit to their constituencies. A decade later, at the advice of Trudeau, the Queen appointed Schreyer to be the first Governor-general of Canada not of British or French background. During the next half century, he was followed by several other "ethnics," including Ray Hnatyshyn, a Ukrainian Canadian from Saskatchewan. Photos courtesy of LAC and the Manitoba Provincial Archives via the Manitoba Historical Society.



However, Book IV of the Report, which made recommendations for those "other" Canadians, languished for almost two full years throughout all these momentous events in

Canadian history. In 1968, the new PM, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, was elected in Ottawa, and in 1969 a new NDP government headed by Ed Schreyer was elected in heavily “ethnic” Manitoba. (About the same time a more “ethnic-friendly” Conservative government replaced the far-right Social Credit government in Alberta.) Trudeau was soon consumed with the French-English problem and with his new foreign policies distancing Canada from participation in the Cold War. But Schreyer, who was of German ethnic background from old Austrian Galicia (the ancestral European homeland of most of Canada’s Ukrainians and Poles, as well as of many Germans and Jews) was sympathetic to the Ukrainians generally. (His wife was of German-speaking Mennonite background, and most of Western Canada’s many Mennonites traced their origins through Ukraine to Western Europe. In the 1960s, some of their older folk were still able to speak either Ukrainian or Russian.) Both men put their stamp upon the events that followed.²⁰

Firstly, Schreyer’s government had been elected by an informal and unspoken “ethnic alliance” of various previously disadvantaged minority groups, and his cabinet reflected it. Unlike Trudeau’s new cabinet, it contained significant German, Mennonite, Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish representation. (Later on, Trudeau’s cabinet too became more diverse.) In Manitoba,



preparations immediately began for the celebration of the centenary of the province, which was to occur in 1970. From the start, these preparations took account of the province’s ethnic diversity, and these culminated in a great Manitoba Mosaic Congress in Winnipeg in October. The use of the “mosaic” concept was a revival of Gibbon’s pioneering efforts of the 1930s, and one of the most memorable conference presentations was the demand of the Ukrainian student representative Bohdan Krawchenko for more equal funding for Canada’s minority ethnic groups. He pointed out that federal financial support for these groups amounted to only a few thousand dollars, while support for the much less numerous French minority outside Quebec amounted to several millions. This clear call for more linguistic and cultural equity was to run

through many editorials, and protests throughout the following year.²¹

Left: Official government announcement for the planning of the Manitoba Mosaic Congress, October, 1970. Noted linguist and old friend of Canadian “national minorities,” Professor Watson Kirkconnell, formerly of United College, Winnipeg, was to be the keynote speaker. Professor Vladimir Kays of the University of Ottawa would also attend.

²⁰ There is a large literature on Trudeau, of which the two-volume biography by John English, *Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto: Viking, 2007-2010) is most detailed. Also see the sparkling essay on him in George Bowering, *Egotists and Autocrats: The Prime Ministers of Canada* (Toronto: Viking, 1999), 396-449. On Schreyer, see the Wikipedia article on him, which mentions some of his Ukrainian contacts: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Schreyer Accessed 8/28/2021.

²¹ See the *Report of Manitoba Mosaic, October 13-17, 1970* (Winnipeg, 1970). The Winnipeg newspaper *Ukrainskyi holos* contained numerous articles describing this congress, beginning October 21, 1970, all of which stressed the idea of the preservation of “various” Manitoba cultures.

MULTICULTURALISM BECOMES A MOVEMENT

Indeed, the Manitoba Mosaic Congress stood in the very middle of a great series of political/cultural conferences and rallies that had begun in December 1968 in Ottawa. That so-called “Thinkers Conference” had been organized by Senator Yuzyk and of course, had diversity and multicultural themes at its core. Another in June 1970 followed; a third came in August at Hart House at the University of Toronto; then came the Manitoba Mosaic Congress in October 1970. Many smaller meetings were also organized, such as a multiculturalism conference in Thunder Bay, Ontario, in late 1970 with active participation of the local Ukrainians and Finns, who were the most numerous of the local “ethnics.” It had been organized by Bill Balan, a student activist originally from Toronto. Finally, still another conference was held in Vancouver by the end of the next year, which was largely an affair of the Ukrainian Canadian Students Union (the Ukrainian acronym for which was SUSK), in which Krawchenko was a central figure.²²

The multicultural movement was most certainly on the march, and Ukrainian politicians, academics, community leaders, students, and businessmen all participated actively. Among the politicians and academics, Rudnycky and Yuzyk were most important; among the students, who generally had good relations with the businessmen, Krawchenko and Andriy Semotiuk took leading roles. The latter was most active going door to door lobbying members of the Ottawa Parliament. The Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen’s Association, with committed activists like Peter Savaryn in Edmonton, and Bohdan Maksymec (Maksymets) in Toronto, took the lead in the business community.²³

TRUDEAU’S “OSTPOLITIK” AND A FREE UKRAINE IN CANADA

But 1971 turned out to be almost as chaotic and threatening for Canada’s Ukrainians as the previous year had been for Quebec and the rest of Canada. That was because the multicultural movement led by them, and supported less vociferously by many other groups, many of them from Eastern Europe, like the Poles, Hungarians, Baltic peoples, Jews and others, came to a climax that year with Trudeau’s new foreign policies. Trudeau was a left-Liberal, who as mentioned above, wished to open closer relations with the “East Bloc” of nations, which were subservient or ideologically friendly to Moscow, including Revolutionary Cuba and (earlier on) Red China. This was carried out simultaneously with newly elected Willy Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* in Germany, warming up to his East European Communist neighbours, including East Germany

²² The importance of this series of multiculturalism conferences was stressed by Marusia Petryshyn, a Ukrainian student activist of the time, at an on-line seminar on “Multiculturalism and Pluralism” sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton, 2021. The great impact of Krawchenko’s speeches (he spoke both at Hart House and in Winnipeg) was noted in “Za rozvitok bahatokulturnosti Kanady,” [In favour of the Development of Multiculturalism in Canada] *Ukrainskyi holos*, 7 October, 1970. It was even recalled to me in the late 1980s by Jeanne Burnett, who was at that time Director of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario. The Thunder Bay conference was described to me by Bill Balan, telephone interview, 30 May, 2021.

²³ Information from Balan, who described Krawchenko and Semotiuk as the most dynamic and charismatic of the Ukrainian student union leaders (SUSK), and Peter Savaryn, who, he said, convinced Peter Lougheed to re-enter politics to become the new Conservative Premier of Alberta, eventually supporting the 1976 foundation of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta. According to Balan, later, it was Savaryn again, who successfully lobbied the Conservative Premier of Manitoba, Sterling Lyon, in favour of Multiculturalism. This occurred sometime after Lyon replaced Schreyer as Manitoba Premier.

and Poland. But in Canada, any warming of relations with the East Bloc would be necessarily dominated by the two “northern neighbours,” Canada and the USSR. Consequently, for the overwhelmingly anti-Communist East European groups in Canada, Ukrainians and others, it seemed that Trudeau was openly going in a direction that they did not like.

Indeed, by the beginning of 1971, Trudeau had come to an agreement with the Soviet Union about an exchange of state visits. This was expected to improve relations and reduce Cold War tensions. Trudeau was seemingly most desirous of closer relations, and it was he who first visited the USSR; a senior Kremlin official, probably the Premier, Alexei Kosygin, was expected to make a corresponding state visit to Canada later.

Most of the organized Ukrainian community reacted immediately and negatively. Although the pro-Communist left represented by the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (still often referred to more simply as the Labour Temples) was positive, almost all other Ukrainian organizations opposed any rushed moves in this direction. For years, some Ukrainian nationalists in Canada had tried to preserve and develop their history and culture in Canada, at times even unrealistically dreaming of building a kind of “Free Ukraine” in the Dominion. This was meant to substitute for the existence of Soviet Ukraine, where their national, cultural, and political rights were severely restricted and only theoretically acknowledged. So, although they then constituted a nation of over forty million people, the Ukrainians had no national state to protect their national interests. In fact, like the Kurds a generation later, who were the largest nationality in the Middle East without a national state to protect them, at that time the Ukrainians were such a nation in Europe.

Therefore, as these nationally inclined Ukrainians saw it, multiculturalism in Canada could be used to strengthen that national culture and that national idea, which was the principal reason that they supported it. Trudeau’s move towards the USSR threatened to legitimize their political enemies, and so their reaction to his soft line on Communism had both Canadian and international implications. The reaction was negative almost to the point of panic.²⁴

But most Ukrainian Canadians, more moderate politically, or simply less interested in international politics, welcomed the multicultural movement simply because it opposed national discrimination, recognised their history and presence in Canada, and raised their prestige. It also legitimized their more visible participation in the Canadian polity. The University of Alberta education specialist, Manoly Lupul, was a good example of this more Canada-oriented position.²⁵

By contrast, many pro-Communist Labour Temple leaders saw through the anti-Soviet motives of their “nationalist” rivals. In consequence, they were cooler towards the idea of a “multicultural” Canada. These Ukrainian pro-Communists, moreover, saw assimilation as inevitable, but at the same time were generally opposed to both undue assimilation and ethnic discrimination, and they were more open towards the French Canadian Two Nations theory that was rejected by most of English-speaking Canada. Within the Communist movement in Canada, however, the Ukrainian pro-Communist organizations tended to be more concerned with their own survival and with the national cause than was the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) and other Communist organizations outside of what the Communists called their “Language

²⁴ These themes run through the entire non-Communist Ukrainian Canadian press of the time, including Winnipeg’s nationalist *Novyi shliakh* (The New Pathway), Toronto’s Conservative *Vilne slovo* (The Free Word), Winnipeg’s unaffiliated *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (The Canadian Farmer), and even the more moderate *Ukrainskyi holos*.

²⁵ Lupul, *Politics of Multiculturalism*.

Federations.” These varied concerns had begun as early as 1967 and came to be most vociferously expressed in 1970 and 1971.²⁶

Right: Anti-Soviet Ukrainian demonstration before the United Nations Building in New York City as reported on the Front Page of Jersey City's *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 8 May, 1971. It was very difficult for some Ukrainian Canadians to adjust to the new foreign policies of Pierre Trudeau. These protesters carried signs denouncing Communism and calling for the freedom of Ukrainian political prisoner Valentyn Moroz. Protesters came from as far away as Montreal, and one of the main speakers was former Canadian pro-Communist, the Labour Temple activist John Kolasky, who had sincerely believed that the USSR protected Ukrainian national rights, but was appalled by the russification he saw in Kiev, when studying there in the 1960s. This demonstration was organized primarily by supporters of the “Banderist” extreme right wing of the Ukrainian communities in Canada and the USA, but many others across North America were sympathetic to the idea of the liberalization of the USSR and to the “freedom for Moroz” movement, though they generally knew very little about Moroz himself.



SALVAGING OSTPOLITIK

At this point, the major question for all the non-Communists was: What benefits might closer relations with the USSR bring to Ukrainian Canadians? Two major themes emerged. Firstly, it was thought that Trudeau could help the Ukrainian cause by increasing the ease with which Ukrainian Canadians could correspond with and visit their relatives remaining in Soviet Ukraine. Permission to visit the USSR and family reunifications were discussed. This was a purely humanitarian matter for most Canadians.

But it was otherwise for the Soviets, whose tight censorship and control of all outside contacts severely restricted relations with individual Ukrainian Canadians, even those with a Labour Temple background or with Communist sympathies. Moreover, the central plank of this opening was encapsulated by the idea of the establishment of a Canadian consular office in Kiev, the largest city in Ukraine and its capital.²⁷

²⁶ See for example P. Prokop, W. Harasym, and M. J. Sago, *Change and Challenge in the Ukrainian Ethnic Group* by (n.p., 1967?), 31 pp., or the Communist Party of Canada's *Horizons: The Marxist Quarterly*, issue for Summer, 1967, which contains the same essay by these three Ukrainian Canadian Communists; further information from telephone conversations with Jars Balan, Edmonton, 2021. On the struggle to maintain the “Language Federations” (Ukrainians, Finns, etc.) against centralizing efforts of the CPC, see especially Peter Krawchuk, *Our History: The Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Movement in Canada 1907-1991* (Toronto: Lugus, 1996), which is a closely documented memoir of a prominent Ukrainian “reform Communist.” Throughout much of the twentieth century, the CPC was partly dependent upon the financial support of these Language Federations, especially the Ukrainians, which made suppressing these Ukrainian organizations problematic for them.

²⁷ “Polychnyk ukraintsiam Kanady,” [A Blow to the Ukrainians of Canada], *Ukrainskyi holos*, 19 May, 1971.

But a Canadian consulate in Kiev also stepped on Soviet Communist toes, for the establishment of such an office would constitute a window for the whole world into highly restricted Ukraine, a window, which might be used by both westerners looking in and by Soviet Ukrainian dissidents looking out. Also, a consular office would give some increased international recognition to the Ukrainian SSR, supposedly an equal republic of the USSR with a seat in the United Nations and ostensibly full rights of secession from the Soviet Union. Such recognition well suited many Ukrainian nationalists in the West who desperately longed for such recognition of their national rights.²⁸ But it was feared by Moscow.

This fear probably reflected the fact that such a consulate would, in fact, give too much legitimacy and international recognition to the Ukrainian SSR, since Moscow was always nervous about nationalism in its non-Russian republics, especially Soviet Ukraine, the largest and most populous of them all. Various East European Communist countries, like Poland and East Germany, already had consulates in Ukraine. But a Western democracy like Canada, which was even a member of NATO, was an entirely different matter.

John Diefenbaker (supposedly a “Cold Warrior”), who remained a warm friend of both conservative and main-stream Ukrainian Canadians, visited Soviet Ukraine in early 1970 and could clearly see these internal Soviet tensions and contradictions. He described some of them in his speech to the UCC later that year, when accepting an award. In fact, in accord with the demands of the UCC, he too urged the establishment of a Canadian consulate in Kiev, pointing out that provision was made for such a consulate-general during the war, when diplomatic relations were first established between Canada and the USSR; but while the Soviets quickly established a consulate in Montreal, Canada had not yet acted to send one to Kiev, or to anywhere else. The Moscow embassy was still Canada’s only diplomatic post in the USSR.²⁹

Meanwhile, in the eyes of Trudeau, it seems that such a consulate and such a move toward recognising Ukrainian national aspirations was most definitely not acceptable. He did not plan to encourage nationalism abroad while discouraging it at home, especially in Quebec. So, he never even seems to have considered such an option. Therefore, just as he ignored the secession of the Province of Biafra in Nigeria – despite considerable public pressure to do something to alleviate the suffering of the Ibo people there – so he ignored the question of a Canadian consulate in Kiev, which could have promoted closer family ties between Ukrainian Canadians and their kin in Europe, but might exacerbate the Quebec question.

The second important matter to be brought up with the Soviets concerned Ukrainian political prisoners in the Soviet system of forced labour camps that had once spread across the USSR from Karelia in the West to Kamchatka in the East. The purges and mass incarcerations of Stalin’s time had been ended by Khrushchev some years before. This seems to have been a move quietly welcomed by almost all Ukrainians in Canada, both Communists and anti-Communists.

But political prisoners were still an important aspect of the Soviet regime, and Ukrainians had always been over-represented among them. Consequently, Ukrainian nationalists in Canada, and many others, who were simply concerned about human rights generally, wished to see Trudeau speak to Moscow on their behalf and perhaps get some of them released. Very soon,

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ “Speech of the Right Honorable John Diefenbaker,” printed in full in English in *Ukrainskyi holos*, 14 October, 1970, 4. Dief reports that during his Soviet tour, when he personally raised this matter with Soviet Ukrainian officials in Kiev, they were at first interested. But, it seems, word quickly came down from above that such a consulate would only be in the interests of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists in the West” and not acceptable to Moscow, which, they assured the former Canadian PM, always took the interests of the Union Republics into account in its dealings with the outside world.

nationalist efforts became focussed on one prisoner, Valentyn Moroz, a history schoolteacher, who had been imprisoned for his underground writings on Ukrainian national rights. Despite pressure from the Ukrainian Canadians, Trudeau was especially reluctant to get involved in these kinds of discussions, for in response, the Soviets could and would reply with accusations about Canadian oppression of Quebec nationalists.³⁰

TRUDEAU TOURS THE SOVIET UNION

It was with these kinds of debates and suggestions swirling about him that in May 1971 Trudeau, and his new wife Margaret, boarded a plane for Moscow. During this eleven-day visit, they traveled from Moscow to Kiev, then to Tashkent in Central Asia, and then to the Soviet North. They were amiably greeted in Moscow, where buildings and streets were decorated by red and white Canadian and Soviet flags and the Communist newspapers extolled the benefits of good relations with Canada. Talks on the reduction of Cold War tensions began, meetings with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin and Nikolai Podgorny were held, and some documents on trade, scientific, and cultural exchanges were signed. One of the most visible results of these agreements was the Canada-USSR Hockey series of 1972, which was to grip the country as no hockey game had ever before.³¹



Pierre Trudeau meets with the Soviet leadership in Moscow. Sitting next to him is his translator, the Liberal MP from Toronto, Ukrainian Canadian Walter Deakon. Sitting across from him is Soviet "Premier" Alexei Kosygin, and fourth down the table from Kosygin is Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

On the wall behind Trudeau hang portraits of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin.

Photo courtesy of the Toronto Public Library.

³⁰ On Moroz, see S.I. Bilokin, "Moroz, Valentyn Yakovych," *Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy* [Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine], vol. 7 (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 2010), 71-72, and Mykhailo Marunchak, *Biohrafichnyi dovidnyk do istorii ukrainsiv Kanady* [Biographical Guide to the History of the Ukrainians in Canada] (Winnipeg: UVAN, 1986), 445, who explains that it was Moroz's statement at his trial "to fight on" that caused the Ukrainians in the West to mobilize in his defence.

³¹ "Prem'ier Trudo v SSSR," [Prime Minister Trudeau in the USSR], *Ukrainskyi holos* 2 June, 1971, 1 and 6; "Dohovir mizh Kanadoiu i SSSR," [The Agreement between Canada and the USSR], *Novyi shliakh* 5 June, 1971, commenting on a first joint news release on Soviet-Canada cooperation. Also see Theodore Shabad, "Trudeau says Pact with Soviet Affirms Independent Policy," *New York Times*, 21 May, 1971.



A fashionable Pierre Trudeau and his beautiful wife Margaret (only recently married) made a great impression upon the Soviets. Here they are seen exiting a plane from one unnamed Soviet city to another. Margaret is wearing a headscarf (*khustka* in Ukrainian, or *baBUSHka* as it is usually called in Canada) typical for traditional Ukrainian and Russian women of that time, and this identification doubtlessly was meant to create some kind of bond between her and them, though Margaret herself was completely non-political, only vaguely representing Western youth. Photo courtesy of the Toronto Public Library.

In Kiev, however, the welcome was even warmer than in Moscow and the crowds much larger. On the one hand, this warmth was probably due to the fact that many Ukrainians knew of the substantial presence of Ukrainians in Canada, and the country was generally seen as a place of prosperity and success; on the other hand, though Trudeau and his entourage did not know or suspect it, some of this warmth was also probably due to the fact that Kiev officials led by Communist Party First Secretary, Petro Shelest, were then fighting a rear-guard action against russification and centralization. This pressure came from Leonid Brezhnev's Moscow and was embodied by his local proxies led by the Ukrainian "Premier" Vladimir Shcherbytsky. (Shelest relied upon the support of fellow Ukrainian Nikolai Podgorny.) International contacts and recognition would then have been especially heartening for those patriotic Ukrainians among the local Communist Party élite and a blow to the russifiers.³² So upon his first arrival in Kiev, Trudeau's party was met at the airport by Shcherbytsky and others, had a tour of the city, laid a wreath to the victims of the "Great Patriotic War," and had talks with Shcherbytsky, though no mention of First Secretary Shelest was made in the official Soviet report about these events, and he does not seem to have participated in them.³³

Had the Prime Minister been more attuned to such matters, he would have noticed, as did the Ukrainian press in Canada, that when his Canadian translator, a Liberal MP from Toronto named Walter Deakon, spoke in Ukrainian to those Soviet Ukrainian officials, in Kiev, the actual capital of Soviet Ukraine, they always answered those questions, not in Ukrainian, the ostensible official language of their Union Republic, but rather only in the Russian of the Moscow centre.³⁴ This was then the general rule when dealing with foreigners throughout the USSR, was more or less the equivalent of replying to French-speaking President Charles de Gaulle only in English, while he was visiting Quebec City, and was hardly conducive to favouring "local" interests over "central" ones.

³² Borys Lewytzkyj, *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine 1953-1980* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1984), 92-168.

³³ "Prem'er-ministr Kanady: Hist Kyieva" [The Prime Minister of Canada, a Guest of Kiev], *Ukraina*, no. 23, May 1971, 5. This followed Soviet protocol, as Shelest was head of the Party, while Shcherbytsky was head of government.

³⁴ *Ukrainskyi holos* 9 June, 1971, 5

Clip from the front page of Winnipeg's Liberal *Ukrainskyi holos* (The Ukrainian Voice), 2 June, 1971, which paid considerable attention to the visit of the Prime Ministerial couple to Moscow and Kiev. From top to bottom, the headlines read: "Prime Minister Trudeau in the USSR," "Prime Minister Trudeau in Kiev," and "The UCC Reaction to Trudeau's Speech in Kiev."

Oblivious to this power struggle, in which a year or so later, purges of the Ukrainian local patriots (sometimes called "national Communists") reached a climax, and Shelest would be removed from power, at an official banquet in Kiev, Trudeau stated that large countries like Canada and the USSR needed a federal system to balance state and local interests and said that he would "seize the opportunity to learn as much as I can of the way your local governments deal with the kinds of problem that face the provinces of Canada." Canadian journalist Charles Lynch, who was part of the PMs entourage, reported that never before had a Canadian Prime Minister been so sympathetic or uncritical of the USSR.

Lynch also reported that the PM and his wife appeared extremely relaxed during their time in Kiev, and that even Ukrainians on the street welcomed the Canadians warmly, on which he waxed eloquent: "If every Canadian has a bit of Ukraine in him, it turned out that every Ukrainian has a bit of Canada. Many have relatives in Canada, and those who don't seem to know quite a bit about the place. As one citizen of Kiev put it to me, he understands that Canada consists of the English in the West, the French in the east, and the Ukrainians in between." "Just call me Lynchenko," concluded the Irish Canadian reporter, who had enjoyed his welcome to Ukraine just as much as had the PM and his consort, whom he deemed the "Trudenkos!"³⁵

From Kiev, Trudeau went on to Tashkent in Central Asia and the Soviet North, particularly the City of Norilsk, where he again praised Soviet methods of development. Throughout his tour, Trudeau stressed that the USSR and Canada were "northern neighbours" which should try to get along with and learn from each other.

Moreover, Kiev was not forgotten. No one in his entourage was more impressed than the Prime Minister himself by the enthusiastic reception he had received in that city. Though it was not at first reported in the press, Trudeau

³⁵ Charles Lynch, "Laughs, Tears, Greet Trudeau in Ukraine," *Winnipeg Tribune* and syndicated in the Southam chain, as reprinted in full in *Ukrainskyi holos* 2 June, 1971, 3. Also see "Prem'ier Trudo v Kyievi," [Prime Minister Trudeau in Kiev] *Ukrainskyi holos* 2 June, 1971, 1 and 6; "Trudo i Ukraina," [Trudeau and Ukraine], *Novyi shliakh* 12 June, 1971.



had given his translator Walter Deakon permission to bring up the matter of the Soviet Ukrainian dissidents, including Moroz, which he did, with the Soviet Ukrainian Premier himself, as well as with others. But Shcherbytsky was visibly irritated by the subject, stiffened up, and in turn, brought up the matter of imprisoned FLQ members in Canada. The whole subject had to be dropped. Trudeau closely remembered this incident, though said nothing about Deakon's unsuccessful attempt at intervention, throughout the acrimonious controversies that followed.³⁶

REACTIONS IN CANADA

However, upon his return to Canada, Trudeau had some very tough questions to answer. Indeed, even before he returned, the UCC had sent the government a sharp protest over his comparisons between Canada and the USSR, and the press, particularly the *Globe and Mail* excoriated him for saying that Canada should follow the Soviet example in northern development, pointing out that the Siberian city of Norilsk, which had so impressed him, had been built with the slave labour of the extensive Soviet prison camp system.³⁷

Indeed, though it was not generally known at the time, the Norilsk camp, which had many Ukrainian prisoners in it, was the locus of the longest and one of the largest slave-labour strikes ever to occur in the Soviet Gulag prison camp system. In fact, at that time, even the very term "Gulag" was unknown in the West. So, when similar criticisms were raised in Parliament by Diefenbaker, Conservative MP Steve Paprocki, and others, they were simply brushed off by the PM. Nevertheless, in the USA, his coolness to the fate of dissidents was criticized, and the *US and World Report* (June 14, 1971) claimed that he had offended about 300,000 Ukrainians living in Canada.³⁸

In Parliament further, Trudeau replied to these criticisms by saying that anyone who breaks the law for the sake of nationalism would not get any sympathy from him, and that had he

THE GLOBE AND MAIL, TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1971

Status of jailed Ukrainians discussed in Kiev, MP reveals

By DOUGLAS GLYNN

The question of jailed Ukrainian nationalists was brought up during Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's recent trip to the Soviet Union but not by Mr. Trudeau himself.

Liberal MP Walter Deakon said last night that the Prime Minister let him bring up the matter during formal talks with Ukrainian leaders in Kiev and informally with the Russians.

"I didn't ask only about Ukrainians, . . . I asked about Czechs and people in the Baltic states too," Mr. Deakon said in an interview.

And he hinted that further talks are expected very soon with Soviet officials about the subject.

Mr. Deakon—himself of Ukrainian descent—said he spoke in Ukrainian to the Ukrainian Premier for about 30 minutes in Kiev, specifically mentioning Valentine Moroz, a popular intellectual imprisoned for demanding language rights for his people.

Mr. Deakon said the Premier became a bit angry when Mr. Moroz's name was used and asked: "Why did you jail those people in the FLQ?"

The MP for High Park said he also:

- Raised the question of providing visas to Czechoslovak Canadians and other ethnic Canadians wanting to return to their own villages during visits to their homelands.
- Mentioned the reunification of families with relatives who have moved to Canada by letting them leave the Soviet Union.
- Asked that some jailed people—including the Ukrainians—be released and allowed to live with their families.

Ironically, Mr. Deakon himself encountered difficulty and finally abandoned plans to visit the village where his own parents lived before coming to Canada. He said when permission was finally granted for the visit, others in the official party were going elsewhere and he preferred to accompany them.

The revelations by him in an interview after he spoke to members of the High Park Liberal Association at a news conference made him

himself following the trip to Russia.

In an interview about the jailed Ukrainians conducted with the Prime Minister on the plane bringing him back to Canada, Mr. Trudeau told CBC Sunday Magazine staff:

"I quite frankly avoided talking about that . . . I didn't particularly feel like bringing up any cases which would have caused Mr. Brezhnev or Mr. Kosygin to say: 'Well you know, why did you put in jail certain FLQ leaders?'"

Mr. Trudeau never mentioned that Mr. Deakon had broached the subject nor, apparently, was he asked if anybody with the official party had. He appeared to be answering only that he had not done so.

Mr. Trudeau's remarks—seeming to link the jailed Ukrainians with Quebec's FLQ—brought storms of protest, especially from the Ukrainian community in Canada.

A delegation of Canadians of Ukrainian origin met Mr. Trudeau on June 7 and were apparently briefed on what had transpired during his Soviet trip.

However, until last night when he alluded to his role during his speech, Mr. Deakon's appeal to Ukrainian and Soviet officials had virtually gone unexplained.

He told the audience that despite a brief display of anger over his reference to Mr. Moroz, the Ukrainian Premier became quite friendly after their talk and said if Mr. Deakon needed any favors to call him.

His speech mainly described living conditions and the way of life of people he met.

His only reference to the jailed Ukrainians in the speech was to mention he had talked for 30 minutes with the Ukrainian Premier "and it was in that room where the FLQ issue arose . . ."

Low-cost loans

Group to study plan to fix up old houses

A special meeting of the city's committee on urban renewal, housing, fire and legislation today will study a draft agreement between Ottawa and Toronto for low-cost loans to fix up old houses.

The plan, under which the Central Mortgage and Housing Corp. is to put up \$1.5-million for mortgages of up to \$18,000, has already received approval in principle from City Council.

Under the draft agreement, prepared by CMHC, the mortgage-lending agency of the federal Government, loans will be available to owners of single-family or semi-detached homes or duplexes.

The \$18,000 maximum is intended to include refinancing existing mortgages and the cost of rehabilitating the house.

Loans are also included to rehabilitate rented premises—up to \$18,000 for a self-contained house or up to \$7,000 per tenant for a rooming or boarding house.

Interest rates on the most

boarding houses on the average income of the tenants.

Rates were originally to vary from nothing to 8.25 per cent, but the top limit has been lowered to 7.875 per cent.

Those with incomes of less than \$3,000 will pay no interest; those earning \$3,000 to \$3,999 will pay 1 per cent, those up to \$4,999 will pay 2 1/4 per cent, and so on by stages until those with incomes of \$7,000 and over a year will pay 7 1/2 per cent.

Every five years the income of the mortgage will be reviewed to find if the interest rate should be changed.

City Development Commissioner Graham Emslie estimates that over the 25-year maximum span of the mortgages the average interest rate paid should be about 3 per cent.

If the urban renewal committee gives its approval today the agreement will go to City Council tomorrow.

However, the city will not

³⁶ Douglas Glynn, "Status of Jailed Ukrainians Discussed in Kiev, MP reveals," *Globe and Mail*, 22 June, 1971.

³⁷ See Nancy Southam, *Pierre: Colleagues and Friends Talk about the Trudeau they Knew* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2005), p. 98. For Trudeau's seeming affection for various Communist regimes, see Robert Plomondon, *The Truth about Trudeau* (Ottawa: Great River Media, 2013), 33-44.

³⁸ See especially *Ukrainskyi holos*, June 9 to 14, 1971. Also see the article on the "Norilsk Uprising," in Wikipedia, which gives further references: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norilsk_uprising Accessed 8/28/2021.

brought up the matter of imprisoned Ukrainians in the USSR, his hosts would have said: “You imprison FLQ nationalists. Why can’t we imprison Ukrainian nationalists?” At which Canadian papers like the *Winnipeg Free Press* commented that the FLQ “kidnapped, murdered, and was alleged to have planned to seize power in Quebec by violence,” whereas the Ukrainian dissidents in Soviet prisons like the writer Viacheslav Chornovil, the “almost blind” scientist Bohdan Horyn, and the peaceful dissident Sviatislav Karavansky were all imprisoned merely for their views, which, in fact, were no different from those of the Quebec separatist leader René Levesque and Trudeau’s own Liberal colleague Gérard Pelletier. The paper concluded that in Canada the B and B Commission had been called to deal with such matters.³⁹

At this point, there stepped into the fray the prominent son of the veteran Ukrainian community politician of the same name, Wasyl Swystun, who penned an open “Letter to the Prime Minister” protesting his seemingly misguided comparisons of a totalitarian dictatorship with a liberal democracy. He also noted that Trudeau seemed to equate the denied rights of a nation of forty million people with those of a mere province, which nonetheless had some autonomy, though it numbered only a few million people.⁴⁰ Reflecting upon the question a few months later, still another Ukrainian Canadian mused that Trudeau did not see the link between his “Just Society” policies in Canada and the ideas of the Ukrainian dissidents, who also wished to build a society based on law and humanitarian values.⁴¹

Indeed, throughout the spring and summer of 1971, the reaction of the organized Ukrainian community in Canada was furious and insistent, especially in eastern Canada, where the most politically active and nationalistic of the Ukrainians (post-1945 Third Wavers) then lived. Those Ukrainians insisted that Trudeau apologize for his pro-Soviet remarks, while others, especially in western Canada, where most of the children and grandchildren of the earlier immigrants then lived, pressed even harder for “multiculturalism.” On 7 June, 1971, meetings between Gérard Pelletier and the Ukrainians, and between the Prime Minister and the Ukrainians, took place, for, as one participant in them later recalled “the Ukrainians required placating, and a policy of multiculturalism on the home front became more important than ever.”⁴² At this meeting with an important Ukrainian delegation, Trudeau said he was sorry if he had hurt the feelings of the Ukrainian Canadians, but he did not retreat from any of his public positions. Afterwards, the press crowded around the Ukrainian delegation and asked what had been discussed. When the UCC President, the Rev. Wasyl Kushnir said nothing, and Winnipeg lawyer Anthony Yaremowych, an important leader of the delegation, hesitated in his explanation, a Toronto delegate, Bohdan Maksymec, stepped forward to answer firmly but somewhat oversimply that the Prime Minister had “apologized.”⁴³


³⁹ Summary in *Ukrainskyi holos*, 9 June, 1971.

⁴⁰ Vasyl Svystun, “Trudo i Ukraina,” [Trudeau and Ukraine], *Novyi shliakh* 12 June, 1971. Yuzyk too criticized what he believed to be Trudeau’s facile and untoward comparisons. See “Senator Yuzyk v oboroni areshtovanykh ukrainsiv,” [Senator Yuzyk in the Defence of the Arrested Ukrainians], *Novyi shliakh* 26 June, 1971.

⁴¹ M. Sulyma, “Moroz i Trudo: Problema chasu...” [Moroz and Trudeau: A Problem of the Times], *Kalendar-Almanakh Novoho Shliakhu za 1972* (Winnipeg), 43-47. “Sulyma” seems to have been the pseudonym of a distinguished Canadian jurist, or, at least, someone who knew quite well both the law and the question of human rights.

⁴² Lupul, *Politics of Multiculturalism*, pp. 161-67. Lupul, who was from western Canada, throughout stresses the difference between the westerners and the Ukrainians in the East.

⁴³ Interview with Jurij Darewych, Toronto, April, 2018.



Left: Clipping from the front page of Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos* (The Ukrainian Voice), 16 June, 1971, describing the meeting between the Prime Minister and the Ukrainian delegation led by UCC President Wasyl Kushnir, who is here seen together with the PM. Right: Covering letter of Prime Minister Trudeau to Professor Jurij Darewych of York University concerning the Prime Minister's take on multiculturalism and on the Ukrainian question in the USSR. Source: Jurij Darewych Papers, Toronto.

THE TRUDEAU-DAREWYCH CORRESPONDENCE

One of the junior members of the delegation, Jurij Darewych, was not satisfied with the PMs position and, shortly later, personally wrote to him explaining the UCC's points in greater detail and with considerable clarity. On cultural rights, he wrote that language rights were very important, and that Ukrainians in Canada felt that they too were a "founding people" in Western Canada. He thought that the Ukrainians were oppressed in the USSR, which made efforts in Canada especially important. This was basically the idea about a "Free Ukraine" in Canada discussed above, and it was this factor, in particular, that made Ukrainian demands in Canada regarding multiculturalism so important and so insistent. Moreover, the existence of Soviet

Ukrainian dissidents and political prisoners underlined this, and it was important to do something to help them. Ukrainian dissidents were not the equivalent of FLQ terrorists.⁴⁴

Shortly afterwards, Trudeau replied with a letter to Darewych. He explained that he did not think that the Ukrainian dissidents in the USSR were the equivalent of the FLQ terrorists, but merely that this would be the argument that the Soviets would present to him had he brought up the matter of imprisoned Ukrainian nationalists in the USSR. He then also went on to say that he did not think that democracy in the USSR was the equivalent of democracy in Canada, but that again, he would not push the matter too far and go on any “Crusade to which there is no limit.” He stood by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign states, and he expected the USSR to do the same regarding Canada and its national problems, particularly on the question of Quebec independence. However, the Prime Minister did note Darewych’s concerns about the fate of the Ukrainian group in Canada and its cultural aspirations, and he assured him that the government would be responding to Book IV of the B and B Commission Report by the fall.⁴⁵

These kinds of debates over the national question in Canada and in the USSR continued throughout the summer of 1971, and especially engaged the Ukrainian Canadian press. By mid-summer, a date was finally announced for the reciprocal visit to Canada of the USSR Premier, Alexei Kosygin. It was to occur in October 1971.

TRUDEAU’S MULTICULTURALISM SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT

By fall, however, Trudeau had planned his next moves in his general campaign for political and constitutional changes in Canada. On 8 October 1971, he at long last rose in the House of Commons to address the Fourth Book of the B and B Commission, the one dealing with “other ethnic groups.” In his speech to Parliament, Trudeau said that the government “accepted all those recommendations of the Royal Commission contained in Book IV.” He continued:

It was the view of the Royal Commission, shared by the government, and I am sure, by all Canadians, that there cannot be one cultural policy for Canadians of British and French origin, another for the original peoples, and yet a third for all others. For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other.... A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians. Such a policy should help to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies...A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create...confidence.

Trudeau then went into the details as to how the government intended to do this, the first of which was to provide help to all cultural groups with a desire to grow and develop. It would do this through special programs in various government departments, agencies, and crown corporations, including the National Film Board and the National Museum of Man as well as the

⁴⁴ Jurij Darewych to Pierre Trudeau, 24 June, 1971, in Darewych papers, Toronto, Ontario, File KUK, [PM’s] Trip to the USSR. This folder contains a large clipping file of articles in the Canadian press sparked by Trudeau’s initial remarks and the meeting between the PM and the Ukrainians.

⁴⁵ Pierre E. Trudeau, letter of 9 July, 1971, to Professor J. W. Darewych, in Darewych papers.

Citizenship Branch of the Secretary of State. All these policies and measures were greeted warmly by various parties in the Commons.⁴⁶

The very next day, Trudeau flew the great distance from Ottawa to Winnipeg to address the Tenth Triennial Congress of the UCC which had just changed its name to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress to better reflect its long-standing “umbrella” character. Before speaking to the Congress, Trudeau met with important local Liberals including MP James Richardson and Provincial Leader Izzy Asper, the latter of whom quickly became a strong supporter of a multicultural Canada.

Trudeau also met with a group of Ukrainian student protesters, who were on a hunger strike concerning the plight of Ukrainian prisoners in the Soviet Union, especially that celebrated figure, Valentyn Moroz, whom they wished the PM to help. These students included political novices, who later became prominent in politics, academia, or culture like Marko Bojcun, Orest Martynowych, Andriy Bandera, Peter Melnycky, Halyna Kowalska, Bohdan Krucko, and others. Each wore a headband with the name of a Soviet political prisoner on it. In fact, Yury Bozhyk, who wore a headband with the name “Moroz” on it, and was more outgoing than many



Group of Ukrainian students on a hunger strike to free Ukrainian dissidents in the USSR. These students were all members of the Ukrainian Canadian Students Union, which was a national organization with branches across the country. The bearded student on the left is Andriy Bandera, son of the controversial Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera (assassinated in Munich in 1959). The student in white on the right is Yuri (George) Bozhyk, who wears a head band with the name “Moroz” on it. The strikers began at the University of Manitoba Student Union building (UMSU) and then moved to an area outside the Fort Garry Hotel where Trudeau was to shortly speak. Press Photo from *Student* magazine, (Toronto, November, 1971), 3, from an original, courtesy of Orest Martynowych, Winnipeg.

of the others, personally confronted the PM with the student demands. After some discussions the PM told the students that if he had more information, he could intervene on behalf of such prisoners, but only as a humanitarian gesture and not a political one, as he did not wish to interfere in internal Soviet affairs. Apparently disconcerted by Moroz’s nationalist reputation, he then asked the students: “Why Moroz?” They told him that he was representative of “intellectual freedom in Ukraine.”⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Press Release, Office of the Prime Minister, Statement by the Prime Minister, House of Commons, October 8, 1971. 6 pages. UCC Archives, Box: Multiculturalism, Oseredok, Winnipeg. Also see: “Desiatyi kongres ukrainsiv Kanady: Pre’ier Kanady P. E. Trudo hostem kongresu,” [Tenth Congress of the Ukrainians of Canada: The Prime Minister as the Guest of the Congress], *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 October, 1971, and “Overdue Recognition,” 3 November, 1971. In this last article, *Holos* expressed the opinion that Trudeau’s recognition was coming very late, and that many Canadian ethnic or cultural groups were already in serious danger of disappearing, and that if even one group is in danger, then all should be worried.

⁴⁷ “Trudeau to Intercede for Ukrainian Political Prisoners,” *Ukrainian Weekly* (Jersey City), 16 October, 1971. Orest Martynowych interview, Winnipeg, September, 2021. These students were all members of the SUSK. Also, see the article in the SUSK newspaper by Halyna Kowalsky, “The Magic Formula: Solidarity Wins Out,” *Student* (Toronto), November, 1971, 3. Only a few years later, in an ostensible “spy exchange,” Jimmy Carter’s National

TRUDEAU SPEAKS TO THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS IN WINNIPEG

Trudeau's address to the UCC turned out to be epochal in the history of the Ukrainian Canadians. It was a very big affair with some six hundred delegates, one hundred invited guests, and many other unofficially attending guests, who crowded into a large banquet hall at Winnipeg's prestigious Fort Garry Hotel. The war hero and the new Lieutenant-Governor of Saskatchewan, Steven Worobetz, was an honorary guest, as was former Prime Minister Diefenbaker. Also attending were Professor Rudnyckyj and Senator Yuzyk. Shortly before, it had been announced in Winnipeg's *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (The Canadian Farmer) and other media that the PM might speak on "the policy and efforts of the government to maintain and develop the cultural-linguistic and other needs of the national minorities of Canada."⁴⁸

The UCC President, Wasyl Kushnir gave the opening address and outlined the present situation and desiderata of the organization. But he undiplomatically came down hard on the academic community, especially university professors and their students who were "corrupting the youth," both Ukrainians and others, with unsavoury ideas (which he did not name). Such professors, claimed Kushnir, simply wanted to "poison" the youth and destroy (*nyshchat*) them. The background to these abrasive remarks was most certainly the anti-war protests of the Vietnam era, but some of the student protesters supporting Moroz took them more generally to mean that the "black hand" (*chorna ruka*) of someone or something had somehow affected them as well, and they reacted negatively. Perhaps it was a good thing that Trudeau, university intellectual that he was, did not hear that speech, and anyway, did not understand the Ukrainian language.⁴⁹

Of course, Trudeau well knew that at that meeting there would be many opponents of the Liberals and supporters of the Conservative Party, and that most certainly he was walking into the strongest anti-Communist ethnic lobby in the country. He was already well apprised of the UCC positions as Darewych (who well reflected them and stressed the historicity of the Ukrainians in Canada) was to speak before him and, of course, the PM had corresponded with him beforehand. The room fell silent as Trudeau rose to speak.

In his address to the Ukrainians, which was a bit longer than his speech in parliament, Trudeau did approach this question, and (though he did not explicitly name them a "founding race") he praised the Ukrainian Prairie pioneers for their hardiness in surviving those difficult initial years on the frozen prairie and taming the wilderness for Canadian civilization. He also obliquely mentioned the discrimination of the past. He stated that things had changed since then, and today no single "racial or linguistic component" of the country held an absolute majority. "Every single person in Canada is now a member of a minority group," he said, Canada therefore

Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, negotiated the release of Moroz and got him out of the USSR along with a small number of other prisoners. But Moroz turned out to be an extremist, a quarrelsome narcissist, and a great disappointment to most of the Ukrainian communities in the West. Indeed, even while still in the Gulag, other prisoners had believed that the KGB was playing upon Moroz's weaknesses, giving him special attention to flatter his ego and to prime him for expulsion from the USSR to the West, where the KGB hoped his narcissism would cause disruption in the nationalist community, as it in fact did. Information from John (Ivan) Jaworsky, Waterloo, Ontario, 2021, who interviewed several of these Ukrainian dissidents after the collapse of the Soviet regime.

⁴⁸ "Vitaiemo delegativ i uchastnykiv X Kongresu Ukraintsiv Kanady!" [We Welcome the Delegates and Participants of the Tenth Congress of the Ukrainians of Canada] *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, 11 October, 1971, 1.

⁴⁹ Martynowych interview. Kushnir's speech is printed in full in *Desiatyi kongres ukraintsiv Kanady* [The Tenth Congress of the Ukrainians of Canada], (Winnipeg: KUK, 1971), 8-12.

“is a multi-cultural society.” Third languages would not have an official character, but would, however, be accorded government support, and all recommendations of the B and B Commission were accepted.



On 9 October 1971, the very day after announcing to the Parliament of Canada the new government policy of “Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework,” the new Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who had three years before, taken over from Lester B. Pearson, as leader of the country, flew the great distance from Ottawa to Winnipeg, and spoke on the same subject to the large and impressive Triennial Conference of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. The photo shows the PM speaking, while the Rev. Wasyl Kushnir (with the eye-glasses) and another cleric are looking up at him from the head table. Diefenbaker, Rudnyckyj, Darewych, Yuzyk, and many others were present at this important meeting. Darewych even gave a keynote speech enunciating Ukrainian desiderata to the federal government, and his ideas appear to have had some effect on Trudeau. Press photo from *Novyi shliakh* (The New Pathway), 30 October, 1971.

Towards to end of his talk, Trudeau even approached his differences with the Ukrainians concerning the USSR: “It is the peculiar attractiveness of Canada and Canadians,” he said, “that we do not encourage the illusory and self-destructive luxury of hatred either in our relations, one with another, or towards persons and governments beyond our borders. It is Canada’s pluralism that has led to this result and that has permitted us as well to exert some modest influence in the world; an influence guided by idealism but moulded by reality.” He then addressed the problem of dissent and the protests of the Ukrainian students that he had met shortly before, explaining that if those students properly formulated their positions, he had agreed to “convey to Premier Kosygin when he comes to this country” the concerns of those students. This statement was immediately met with “loud applause.”

Trudeau then quoted the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko on hope, and then Sir Wilfred Laurier as cited in one of the briefs to the Royal Commission: “[Now I would like Canada to become like a cathedral.] I want marble to remain marble; granite to remain granite; oak to remain oak; out of all these elements I would build a nation great among the nations of the world.” He then mentioned by name Ukrainian artists like William Kurelek, and Leo Mol, and the Ukrainian composer George Fiala, and ended by saluting the contributions made to Canada by persons of all ethnic origins.

This speech reiterating multiculturalism and the mosaic idea was met with pure “elation” by those usually very vociferously anti-Communist Ukrainians present. The entire assembly joined together and stood to sing a resounding rendition of *Mnohaya lita*, the Ukrainian anniversary song wishing him “Many Years!” People rushed forward to meet the PM and shake his hand, and pictures were published in the press of Trudeau surrounded by friendly Ukrainian Canadians, including UCC President Wasyl Kushnir. Paul Yuzyk, in particular, could be very satisfied that “biculturalism” had been dropped and the newer conception of “multiculturalism,” for which he had worked so hard, accepted.⁵⁰



Upper right: Clipping from the front page of Winnipeg's *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (The Canadian Farmer), 18 October, 1971. This paper, which billed itself as "The Leading Weekly of the Enlightenment-Information Movement," was traditionally run as a business enterprise rather than a political tribune for any of the Ukrainian organizations, but by the early 1970s was quite conservative. The picture shows Trudeau speaking at the Congress. The headlines include (at the top) a reference to a political compromise, in which the Congress and the UCC were considerably democratized under pressure from the youth, and Kushnir agreed to stay on only one more year, and (below the picture of the PM talking): "He will speak to Kosygin about the [Political] Prisoners."

⁵⁰ “Nova polityka uriadu,” [The Government’s New Policy) *Kanadiiyskyi farmer*, 1 November 1971, 3, printed most of the speech in the original English, though the Press Release (9 pages) used by the paper and issued by the Prime Minister’s office on his “Remarks” warns the reader: “CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY.” UCC Archives, Box Multiculturalism, Oseredok, Winnipeg. Both Trudeau’s address (complete with his remarks on the students) and that of Darewych are printed in *Desiatyi kongres* (KUK), 116-23 (Darewych in Ukrainian), and 139-44 (Trudeau in English). This version seems to be more complete. Michael Wawryshyn, a Toronto delegate, later used the word “elation” in an interview with me in Toronto. December. 2017.

Indeed, a photo of a very happy Yuzyk together with others presenting Trudeau with the two weighty volumes of the new *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* was published in Winnipeg's pro-Conservative *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (The Canadian Farmer) under the suggestive headline: "So that he will know Ukraine Better!" No one seemed to notice any caution about "the self-destructive luxury of hatred" towards "governments beyond our borders," and Manoly Lupul, an important Alberta delegate present, later recalled that "Trudeau was hailed as a messiah!"⁵¹ Among the entire Ukrainian Canadian press, alone the pro-Communist *Zhyttia i slovo* (Life and Word), which was published both in Winnipeg and Toronto, ignored the speech, though it did publish an editorial outlining and cautiously welcoming Trudeau's new policy.⁵²

Senator Paul Yuzyk presents Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau with a copy of the recently published two-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press). Yuzyk stands in the middle with officials of the American-based Ukrainian National Association (who sponsored this edition) on the left, and Trudeau and prominent Winnipeg businessman Mark Smerchansky, who was a Liberal MP, next to him on the right. Pointing to Trudeau's apparent disinterest in, and admission of ignorance of, the Ukrainian question, *Kanadiiskyi farmer's* caption beneath the photo suggestively reads: "[So that] he will know more about Ukraine."



At the same time, it should be said that Borys Gengalo, a young Winnipeg delegate, while thanking the PM in what appeared to be an official response, also pointed out that he had taken only the first step along recognizing the equality of all Canadians, and it would have to be followed up with further action. As well, Rudnyckyj noticed that nothing was said of his dissenting opinion on languages, that is, his important *Votum separatum* in the B and B report. Others present, like delegate Michael Wawryshyn, and a very young Jars Balan, years later expressed some reservations about the speech. Even then, Wawryshyn still thought that Trudeau's entire speech favouring multiculturalism, and especially his visit to Winnipeg, was a ploy to pacify the Ukrainians on the very eve of Kosygin's visit. Certainly, the timing could not have been more suggestive.⁵³

⁵¹ *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, 1 November, 1971, 2; Lupul, *Politics of Multiculturalism*, 169.

⁵² "Dopomoha dlia etnichnykh kultur" [Help for Ethnic Cultures], *Zhyttia i slovo*, 25 October, 1971.

⁵³ On Gengalo's response, see "Desiatyi kongres," (KUK), 44-45; Wawryshyn interview; Martynowych interview; Jars Balan telephone conversation; Lupul, *Politics of Multiculturalism*, 165.

ALEXEI KOSYGIN VISITS CANADA

Only a week or so later, Alexei Kosygin got off his plane from Moscow and stepped onto Canadian soil.⁵⁴ His security was extremely tight, and he was surrounded by Soviet and Canadian guards. As large numbers of demonstrators were not allowed into the airport, he was met there by only a few Canadian government officials and well-wishers. Shortly after his arrival, the Soviet leader signed an important agreement with the Canadian government on increased trade, and academic, cultural, scientific, and sporting exchanges. It was this agreement, in fact, that made possible the Canada-USSR Hockey Series of 1972, a landmark in Canadian and international sport, remembered well into the twenty-first century.



Official press release of the Canada-USSR Trade and Exchange Agreement of 1971. Kosygin is on the left, and Trudeau on the right. The Prime Minister wears what appears to be a red flower on his lapel. Quite understandably, this optimistic photo was published on the front page of the pro-Communist newspaper of the Ukrainian Canadian Labour Temple movement *Zytia i slovo* (Life and Word) (1 November, 1971), but not in any of the non-Communist Ukrainian Canadian newspapers. This copy is courtesy of the Toronto Public Library.

But protesters and demonstrators crowded around him elsewhere. He had been billed by the media as one of the most liberal of the Kremlin men, but the demonstrations were large and boisterous. Most of the protesters were of East European origin, who objected to Communist rule in their countries or Soviet annexation of their homelands. Of the latter, Ukrainians, who wanted independence and the end of Communism, and Jews who wished for freedom to emigrate for Soviet Jews, were probably the most prominent. These demonstrations, reported *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, “were marked by shouts, songs, the burning of the Soviet flag, broken windows, and placards.” Many protesters gathered around the Soviet embassy, but Kosygin avoided them by going directly to the Château Laurier Hotel, where the visiting Soviets had booked two full floors.⁵⁵

Still, while walking across the Parliament grounds, Kosygin was jostled and booed, and a Hungarian protester named Geza Matrai got past his guards and jumped on him while shouting “Long live Free Hungary!” Kosygin was almost brought to the ground, and afterwards Trudeau

⁵⁴ “Kosygin to Visit Canada for Eight-day Tour,” *Globe and Mail*, 8 September, 1971, noted that this visit was coming extraordinarily fast after Trudeau’s tour of the USSR, a diplomatic curiosity to say the least.

⁵⁵ “Demonstratsiiamy vitaiut Kosygina v Kanadi, [Demonstrations Greet Kosygin in Canada] *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, 25 October, 1971, 1.

declared that this was an insult to Canada. Meanwhile, unexploded bombs, and materials for Molotov Cocktails, were found by the police near the Soviet embassy. Inside the embassy, the Soviet consul could not get out to meet his superior, and it was announced that Kosygin's eight-day visit might be shortened. *Kanadiiskyi farmer* opined that "it is doubtful whether Kosygin was more upset than Trudeau was embarrassed by all this." The paper also informed its readers that Geza Matrai was a member of the rightist John Burke Society, had run for Social Credit in a provincial election, but was merely an unarmed "Hungarian patriot." The paper obviously sympathized with Matrai and thought him to be no dangerous terrorist, an important point considering the murder of Pierre Laporte and other events of October 1970.⁵⁶

In this same issue, *Kanadiiskyi farmer* reported that in a meeting with the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Paul Yuzyk informed Kosygin that the Ukrainians had achieved much in a free Canada and they wished to see their relatives still in the USSR, and he asked about family reunification. He also made a point of querying him about Ukrainian political prisoners and Valentyn Moroz in particular. Kosygin replied that if Moroz was in jail, he must have broken the law, and that he could not interfere with the Soviet court system. This response, the paper concluded, was met with dubious but knowing “smiles all around.”⁵⁷



Upper right: Clip from the front page of Winnipeg's *Kanadiyskiy farmer* (The Canadian farmer) reporting Senator Yuzyk's questioning of Kosygin before a Parliamentary committee and showing Geza Matrai's attack on him on the grounds of Parliament. The caption beneath the photo reads: "He will not forget this visit." The unusual motto at the top of the page reads: "Truth against power! We fight against evil!" Meanwhile, the Labour Temple's *Zhyttia i slovo* (1 November 1971) simply reported the Canadian government position that Matrai's attack would not affect Canada-USSR relations and that Kosygin had invited Yuzyk to visit the USSR as part of a Parliamentary exchange.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* Also see “Dynamite Bombs, Molotov Cocktails, among Police Headaches: Guarding Kosygin turns into Nightmare Task,” *Globe and Mail*, 19 October, 1971.

⁵⁷ "Senator Yuzyk konfrontuie A. Kosygina," [Senator Yuzyk Confronts A. Kosygin] *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, 1 November, 1971. Throughout its reporting, *Kanadiiskyi farmer* referred to Kosygin demeaningly as a "*Sovietchik*." Perhaps this was a play on the Russian word *razviedchik*, a "spy," for which profession the Soviets became famous during the Cold War.

An elderly female protester seemed to be overwhelmed by the massive police presence trying to control the demonstrations at the Toronto Science Centre, where Kosygin was scheduled to speak to the élite Canadian Manufacturers Association during the Ontario lap of his Canadian tour. But an inquiry into police action later found that more than one thousand policemen on foot were not enough to control the crowds, and insufficiently trained mounted city policemen were used as a last resort. The next day, with Margaret Trudeau and various officials waving goodbye to him, Kosygin flew off to Cuba, remarking that Toronto is “a very wonderful city.” Photo courtesy of the Toronto Public Library.



In fact, the biggest demonstrations against Kosygin occurred in Toronto, the heartland of the strongly anti-Soviet post-1945 Ukrainian immigration, most of them so-called Displaced Persons (DPs) and their children. Although Jewish groups had a very high profile, this group of Ukrainians probably constituted the largest contingent among the many ethnic groups protesting. In particular, there was a great confrontation near the Toronto Science Centre and mounted police pushed into the crowd, injuring many people and frightening the rest. The crowds had to flee to escape the clattering horses. Many demonstrators were arrested, some people were trampled by the horses (though badly bruised, they survived), and several were otherwise hurt and went to hospital.⁵⁸

Indeed, a few months later, the police publicly reported that Kosygin had faced many risks in Canada, and they grew greater the longer that he stayed. According to the RCMP, the Soviet leader had “faced a greater risk of assassination in Toronto than in Ottawa,” for though he had been attacked in Ottawa, which had attracted many demonstrators, Toronto was the major demographic centre of the East European groups. The RCMP report also confirmed the story of the bombs and Molotov Cocktails near the Soviet embassy, noted a thwarted assassination attempt by a Gulag survivor in Toronto, and, among other dangers, a plan to throw fire bombs through the windows of the Science Centre, where Kosygin was scheduled to speak.⁵⁹

After Kosygin had left, lawsuits and that Provincial Inquiry on police behaviour followed. A group of Ukrainian lawyers won their suit and the Inquiry concluded that the

⁵⁸ See especially the detailed eyewitness reports in *Novyi shliakh* 6 November, 1971. Also see “Z vidvidennia Kosygina v Kanadi,” [From Kosygin’s Visit to Canada], *Ukrainskyi holos*, 3 November, 1971, which stresses the international character of the anti-Kosygin demos and specifically names Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Jews, Czechs, and others. Also see “Police on Horses Charge Crowd 4 Times,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 26 October 1971.

⁵⁹ “Danger to Kosygin greatest in Toronto, RCMP Inspector says,” *Globe and Mail*, 25 January, 1972. Also see “2000 police guard Kosygin in Toronto,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 25 October, 1971, and “\$50,000 offered for Kosygin Assassination, inquiry told,” *Globe and Mail*, 26 January, 1972. However, John Hilliker and others, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs*, vol. III, (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada; Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 110-111, maintain that these demonstrations and Trudeau’s controversial Soviet openings made less of an impression upon Canadians than the Canada-USSR hockey series, which followed the next year, that is in 1972, though, at first, that too sparked protests of various kinds. For Margaret Trudeau waving goodbye to the Soviet leader, see “Happy Kosygin calls Toronto ‘A wonderful city’,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 26 October, 1971, complete with press photo.

Toronto Police were inadequately trained to deal with such mass demonstrations.⁶⁰ In fact, if Trudeau's multicultural speeches in Parliament and in Winnipeg were partly a ploy to buy off those Canadian ethnics, especially the Ukrainians, it most certainly did not work, and his warning against hatred for foreign persons and governments had turned out to be ineffective indeed.

An outside American opinion: Kosygin and Trudeau, battered and bruised after a worrisome official Soviet tour of Canada, walk through a minefield of bombs and explosions, including "Hungarian Protest," "Quebec separatist movement," "Air Hijacking," "Jewish Protest," and in the top left-hand corner, "Minority Squabbles." The last of these refers somewhat disparagingly to the controversy over "bilingualism and biculturalism" and the emerging ideology of "multiculturalism." Kosygin says to Trudeau: "It is good to have peaceful co-existence with democracy, but I wouldn't want to live with it!" Source: *Christian Science Monitor* as reprinted in *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (The Canadian Farmer), 28 October, 1971.



MULTICULTURALISM MARCHES ON

Meanwhile, the multicultural movement continued. Though Trudeau's declaration of the new government policy was warmly welcomed, some people still had their misgivings. Rudnycky in particular, was greatly disappointed that multilingualism was rejected and described the new policy as "majoritarian dualism and minoritarian pluralism."⁶¹

In the short term, his *Votum separatum* for bilingual districts for non-French and non-English speakers was completely rejected and nothing of this sort ("national-territorial autonomy," it might be called) was done for the languages with which he was most concerned: Ukrainian, German, and Italian. In the next years, despite the initiation of some new cultural programs, especially in the schools and universities, these languages continued their precipitous decline. Some half-century later, that is, by the 2020s, in fact, language-learning, like Ukrainian on the Prairies, closely resembled the study of Gaelic in Ireland, a program, which touches importantly upon national pride, but has more of a symbolic than a practical value.

⁶⁰ Information from Jurij Darewych, Toronto; also from Roman Senkus, Toronto, a young, first-year university student at the time, who was present at the Science Centre demo, and had to flee the police horses along with the others, leaving his back-pack and Russian language textbook to be trampled by the animals.

⁶¹ See "A Multicultural Policy for a Multicultural Nation," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 24 November, 1971, 2.

However, in the long term, his *Votum separatum* was fulfilled in certain respects having to do with the native Canadian “Indian and Eskimo languages.” For these tongues of the “First Nations” (as they are called today) eventually came to have official status in some parts of the country, especially in Nunavut, the new Canadian territory in the eastern Arctic. The move toward official status for native languages in other parts of the country also began about this same time.⁶²

Of much wider influence, though perhaps more transient, newcomers to Canada soon felt the policy of multiculturalism benefitted them in certain ways, as for example, in language and cultural schools for their children, many of them now born in Canada. Much more difficult to measure, though perhaps of much greater import, was the rise in status among such new immigrants: their self-confidence was increased by the policy, and their pride in their ancestral cultures was enhanced. A common immigrant inferiority complex, felt by many low-status newcomers, was circumscribed. The whole policy was turned into the basic law of the land in 1982, when it was mentioned in the new Canadian constitution in the section titled the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was patriated that year, to be signed into law by Queen Elizabeth II in Montreal. These multicultural rights remained vague in the Charter but were further defined by statute in 1988 and carried forth certain ideas about the removal of national, ethnic, and religious discrimination that had first been explicitly adumbrated by Diefenbaker in his 1960 Bill of Rights.



Queen Elizabeth II signs the new Constitution of Canada into law, Montreal, 1982. In its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Constitution states that Canada is a “Multicultural” country.

Source: Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa.

PIERRE’S PRAGMATISM

But how much of this was tied to the ideas and political philosophy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau? Though posing as cosmopolitan, was he ever concerned about Canada’s “other” ethnic groups? Or was his new policy just a necessary compromise made to get his French-English

⁶² Rudnyckyj’s ideas may be considered by some as a precedent for certain twenty-first century positions and developments. See for example, Roman Petryshyn, “How Canadian Ethnocultural Communities can respond to the T[ruth and] R[econciliation] C[ommission]: The Case of Métis and Ukrainian-Canadians in a Constitutional Framework,” (2021). Unpublished paper.

bilingual program accepted by the country, and to shut up those noisy ethnics, especially the Ukrainians, in the face of the Kosygin visit?

On the one hand, Trudeau did pose as a defender of pluralism and national equality. He did get his policy through, and it was enormously successful in both practical ways, such as raising the status of new immigrants from the non-Anglo-Saxon world, in at least temporarily holding back Quebec separatism, so that the country could adjust to new conditions, and in helping to redefine Canada in a new native and non-imperial context. Today the British Empire is completely gone, but multiculturalism proudly stands as an essential part of the Canadian identity.

On the other hand, as Trudeau bluntly stated to Jurij Darewych in the summer of 1971, and again at the great Ukrainian Congress in Winnipeg, he was a pragmatist. He hoped to bring the ethnics on board with his French-English bilingual program for the country, both in 1971, when he was beginning his Prime Ministership, and a decade later when he tried to get at least one Western province onto the official bilingualism bandwagon by again raising the banner of multiculturalism in Manitoba, that then most thoroughly multicultural of provinces. His officials and others undertook a strong campaign to do so by stressing to Manitoba minority groups the value of the official French-English bilingual policy, which had been accepted provincially in Quebec and New Brunswick, and to a lesser degree in Ontario, but nowhere in the West.

His local Manitoba officials, of whom Bill Balan was one, did their best; together with others, like the Alberta Progressive Conservative Peter Savaryn, they convinced the new Conservative Premier of Manitoba, Sterling Lyon, of the value for the province of a bilingualism linked to multiculturalism. According to polls, these efforts succeeded in raising the popularity of a Provincial Declaration of Bilingualism/Multiculturalism from fourteen per cent to thirty-nine percent. But in the end it failed. Multiculturalism in the West could only carry French-English bilingualism so far.⁶³

Trudeau's pragmatism showed especially while campaigning, even in smaller, more personal, and less directly political ways. So, Charles Lynch, the journalist who toured the USSR with him, quipped that later on "seeking the Ukrainian vote, Trudeau...met with [the prominent churchman] the visiting Joseph Cardinal Slipyj and bowed from the waist before him. Afterwards he promptly kissed every girl who could break through the police guard."⁶⁴

Furthermore, later on, Trudeau actually appointed Ed Schreyer to the post of Governor-general of Canada, the representative of the Queen, and the highest public officer of the land. This was of great moment for Canada's ethnics, for Schreyer was the first person not of British or French background to be appointed to this dignity, which symbolized Canadian sovereignty. But at the same time, when Schreyer made his first speech in the Parliament of Canada, and began by addressing the assembly in English, French, German, Ukrainian, Italian, and Polish, Trudeau was seen scowling at the gesture, hardly indicative of the respect that Schreyer and those "Canadian languages" (as both Rudnycky and Yuzyk had put it) deserved on that important day.⁶⁵ Moreover, in his political memoirs, Trudeau spent a considerable amount of

⁶³ Telephone interview with Bill Balan, 30 May, 2021.

⁶⁴ Charles Lynch, *The Lynch Mob: Stringing up our Prime Ministers* (Toronto: Key Porter, 1988), 78.

⁶⁵ As broadcast on CBC News. Personal recollection.

space on his bilingualism efforts, and on constitutional reform. But he completely ignored the multiculturalism question, and he did not even mention the word once in the entire book.⁶⁶

In this way, it may be said that multiculturalism was indeed the child, not so much of the practical politician, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who was indifferent to it and even dismissive of it (though in the end, he accepted it, and a generation later his son Justin sincerely promoted it). Rather multiculturalism was the much-loved child of the Ukrainian Canadians, who fought so hard for it every step of the way. Indeed, multiculturalism may have been the distant offspring of Laurier, Gibbon, and Tweedsmuir, and the grandchild of Kaye and Davidovich; it may even have been the adopted stepchild of Pierre Trudeau himself. But it was the direct child and heir of Rudnyckyj and Yuzyk, of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, of the student activists of the Ukrainian Canadian Students Union, of the Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen's Association represented by Maksymec and Savaryn, and of many, many others. It is primarily due to the efforts of these pioneers of the movement that official multiculturalism was accepted in Canada and, for a time at least, became a model for many other countries and nations. This is a historical fact that is still little discussed in Canada, and is still completely unknown abroad, though perhaps, one day, that will change.



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⁶⁶ Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Memoirs* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993).